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Abstract:
One third of the Indian companies are controlled by one or another family members in concert.
In recent past corporate governance crisis is surfaced in few family controlled business houses.
We studied financial & market performance of 44 top Indian companies listed in Forbes Global
2000, which includes 19 family controlled companies. We compared financial & market
performance of family based companies with the non-family based companies. It is observed that
family based business have higher revenue and profit generating capabilities, but we observed
greater fall in market value of their securities during 2008.
Our research identified companies, which faced corporate governance problem. It is found that
one third of the family based companies have corporate governance problems. Our investigation
shows that in spite of strong corporate governance framework & series of legislation in India, top
management violates governance norms either to favor family members or due to jealousy
amongst sibling. It is found that there is lack of supervision and inefficiency in prosecuting
violators. We investigated in detail the recent serious governance failure at India’s 4th largest IT
firm, Satyam Computers Services Limited and reasons of such large magnitude failure of checks
& balances in action. We have used primary & secondary data to substantiate the conclusion
using appropriate research techniques. The research is useful to the policy makers in designing &
implementing corporate governance framework in general & special to family based companies.
Introduction:
Before the word ‘corporate governance’ became a buzzword in the modern era, Indian culture &
literature widely referred & advocated good corporate governance in spirit without naming it as
corporate governance. The Directive Principles mandates that the State should work to prevent
concentration of wealth and means of production in a few hands, and try to ensure that
ownership and control of the material resources is distributed to best serve the common good.
[Article  38,  Constitutional  Law  of  India]  Gandhian  philosophy  is  based  on  1st verse  of
Ishopshinad (sacred Hindu literature), which vows, “Tena Tyaktena bhunjithah…”, where, one is
asked to dedicate everything to God and then use material things only to the required extent. The
message enshrines that one must not covet what belongs to others. A corporate entity stands on
the pillars of Trusteeship and Accountability. According to a study (1998) conducted on
ownership, 30% businesses are family controlled, 36% are widely held while 18% are state
owned. In India, major business houses are equally controlled by family or otherwise. 17 of 30
companies in SENSEX (how security index at Bombay Stock Exchange known as) are family
controlled. In our study comprised of 44 top Indian companies listed in Forbes Global 2000, 19
companies are family controlled.
Till 1980, majority of big corporate houses in India were family run businesses and founded by
first generation entrepreneurs. The then biggest & successful business houses like Tata, Birla &
Bajaj practiced voluntarily all good corporate governance practices by spirit. A century old
Memorandum of Tata referred Corporate Social Responsibility and in spite of absence of any
express code for corporate governance, there was no major failure on governance issues in these
business houses. Indian Company Act, 1956 contains express legal code, which are pertaining to
good corporate governance practices.
Indian corporate has taken challenges of globalization and has grown at 7-8% per annum. 25% of
GDP is from manufacturing sector while 55% from service sector. Over 700,000 companies are
registered in India till 2007, which was little over 1,00,000 in 1991, the year when India
embarked to economic reforms. Primary & secondary market also has grown manifold in the last
two decades. Due to series of economic & legal reforms, the business has grown so as problems
of governance. As per report by Ministry of Company Affair’s statement in 2006, over 400
companies listed on the stock exchanges in Mumbai are facing prosecution for violating various
statutory requirements. The Department of Company Affairs (DCA) has moved for prosecution
of these companies as they failed to file annual returns and submit balance sheets, mandatory
under the Companies Act provisions.
Principle of trusteeship:
After 1995, with global movement on corporate governance, India too formulated committees on
corporate governance (namely – Kumar Manglam Birla, Narayan Murthy, Naresh Chandra & J.J.
Irani Committee) at various level and basis of recommendation of such committees, SEBI
(Security Exchange Board of India) codified clause 49 as part of security listing agreement.
These codes are applicable to listed companies only, and there is no similar code for un-listed
company how so big it is. Government of India announced guidelines in 2007 on corporate
governance for Central Public Sector Units. However it is voluntary in nature. Various
Accounting Standards also incorporated financial issues on conflict of interest, related party
transactions, transparency & disclosure. Clause 49 is exhaustive and provide for composition of
board & audit committees of independent directors, risk management, many specific disclosures
in Annual Reports and certifying financial results.
As Institute of Company Secretaries of India states, "For making corporate governance work, we
have to go through a profound metamorphosis and develop an inner value system which prides
on ethics, morality, equity, legitimacy, transparency and values dissent and diversity." SEBI
committee defined corporate governance: “Corporate governance is the acceptance by
management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as the true owners of the corporation and of
their own role as trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about commitment to values, about
ethical business conduct and about making a distinction between personal and corporate funds in
the management of a company.” Indian cultural values are imbibed in corporate governance
norms. We studied top Indian companies in terms of financial & market performance & probed
companies facing governance problem and reasons thereof.
Issues in Family Controlled Business:
Due to high involvement of the promoters in business activities, either at strategic level or in
day-to-day affairs, business performance is better. Due to explicit or implied concentration of
power among family members, they are able to take quick decisions in response to market
demands. Another benefit is obvious, that promoters are continuously monitoring & protecting
assets of the company due to their own stake in the business. On the other hand, modern
corporate principally run as a democratic principles. If majority is in favour of a family, they are
able to take decisions as they like and in their general interest. The good corporate governance
principle requires decisions in favour of interest of company rather than in interest of member or
members. More particularly, in circumstances of conflict of interest, human tendency incline to
decide in his favour instead of the company. Corporate Governance insists otherwise. In second
situation, when, there is a conflict of interest between society (or state) and company, human
tendency is to take decision that favours company, corporate governance principles expects
otherwise.
Corporate Governance vis-à -vis Conflict of Interest
This conflict generally happens more frequently & in higher magnitude in family controlled
business. Our survey indicates that 80% of business decisions are in contravention of above
expected corporate governance norms. 68% of respondents replied that there is severe problem
of corporate governance in family based businesses, which are listed in stock exchange.
What is corporate Governance?
Different individuals & bodies define Corporate Governance (CG) differently. Our surveyed
respondents understood (the total % will be more than 100 as respondent could answer more than
one) corporate governance as follow:
Perception as what is Corporate Governance:
What is CG? Law Set of principles System Ethic Concept Method Approach
% respondent 61 20 18 34 45 12 9
There are different meanings in mind of investors, auditors & managers as to what corporate
governance means and all seems to be valid. But large pool believes that corporate governance is
law. Managers believe it as a tool of wealth maximization and hence an approach or a method.
Data Analysis:
We studied financial & market performance of top 44 Indian companies listed in Forbes Global
2000. The financial performance is related to year ending 2008, and market performance is
compared between December 2007 & December 2008. We also studied market performance
when the stock prices were on pick vs. bottom. We have classified the data on assets owned by
selected 44 companies on the basis of ownership into family based companies (FBC-19), Public
Sector Units (PSU-18) and widely held other than family based & PSU (OWC-7) for year 2007-
08. The year 2008 remained highly volatile and in January 2008, the SENSEX (Bombay Stock
Exchange Index) went on 21200 as the pick, while it was nose-dived in October 2008 at 7600. It
was thus fall of 63%. The SENSEX on 31st December 2008 was 52% compared to last year. The
family based business shows fall of 61% during the period. Other OWC has fall of 53% while
PSU is the least to suffer, i.e. only 44.53%.
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It could be interpreted that market has higher confidence in PSUs while family based business
the least. It could also be interpreted that family controlled businesses are influencing in bringing
the market up artificially.
Financial Performance:
It is found that, 64% of the total assets are owned by PSU. While 21% & 19% are owned by
FBC & OWC respectively.
Asset
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PSU, numbering 18 companies, they hold the highest assets (64%) among total assets held by all
44 companies together. 19 family based company hold 21% assets. This means family controlled
business make investment in conservative manner.
Using these assets worth Rs. 858500 million, the selected 44 companies could generate revenue
of Rs. 281645 million. 58% of the revenue is generated by PSU while 32% & 10% of the
revenue is generated by FBC & OWC respectively.
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Using 21% of total assets, family based companies could generate 32% of the sale, while PSU
could generate 58% sale by using 64% assets, it means family based businesses are aggressive in
employing assets to generate business revenue. It means personal stake in the business made it
more efficient in employing assets on use.
These companies earned profit of Rs. 33313 million. 45% of the profit is earned by FBC while
44% & 11% profit is earned by PSU & OWC. Market cap of these units is approximately Rs.
710119 million, contributed 51% by FBC, 33% by PSU & 16% by OWC. It means FBCs are
able to generate better revenue from the unit asset owned by them. Asset Turnover ratio of FBS
amounts to 0.51, while that of PSU & OWC is 0.30 & 0.22 respectively. Family Based
Companies generated profit as 16.87% of sales and 8.53% of assets by them. PSU could generate
profit as 8.90% of sales and 2.65% of assets by them. OWC could generate profit as 12.64% of
sales and 2.74% of assets by them.
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Family based companies are more efficient in terms of restricting the cost or expenses and hence
could generate higher profit using unit assets.
Market Performance:
Year 2008 has been witnessed as unique in terms of market fluctuation. Major index known as
SENSEX went up to high as 21206 in January 2008 and lowest as 7697 in October 2008. This
indicate fall of 63.74%. There is market fall of 52.45% in SENSEX, comparing December 31,
2007 with that of December 31, 2008. During the same period market fall for FBC was 60.59%,
44.53% in PSU and 52.98% in OWC. Approximately one third of the SENSEX companies are
from Family Based Companies. FBC suffered the major loss in the market, in spite higher asset
turnover & profitability ratio. PSU suffered the least among all; means with moderate financial
ratio, public & investor confidence is high in PSU. Observing the market cap as below
mentioned chart, we conclude that family based business work aggressive on increasing market
cap that is 51% while PSU market cap is only 33%. FBC are 19 while PSU are 18 in number.
Market Cap
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Market cap of FBC is half of total while their assets are 21%. Using a unit of assets family based
business could generate 0.51 unit of sale, but failed to win investor confidence in the market.
PSU could generate 0.30 unit of sale per unit of asset but shown higher market confidence. OWC
could generate 0.22 unit of sale, being moderate among all three type of business.
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Thus, the study shows that family based business has strong tendency to increase market cap,
inflating share prices in the secondary market and aggressive use of assets and more cost
effective. However this study has a limitation on type of industries in each sector, and has
different composition in any one sector, e.g. there are more number of banks under PSU. FBC
inflates stock prices are reflected during 2008 fall in the stock prices.
Legal Framework to implement Corporate Governance:
To ensure good corporate governance, historically there is strong legal framework existing in
India. But due to globalization, cutthroat competition, IT & media invasion, increasing social
expectation, liberalization and political, economical, financial & legal reforms; existing legal
framework is at stake and new corporate governance norms are evolving. Indian Constitutional
Law of India is the root for direction in implementing good corporate governance. Article 38
directs government to ensure equitable distribution of wealth. The clause state that government
should work to prevent concentration of wealth and means of production in a few hands, and try
to ensure that ownership and control of the material resources is distributed to best serve the
common good.
The structure of ownership of any business determines substantially, how a business is controlled
and managed. The ownership structure in modern corporate generally is dispersed between
numerous individual & group of individual or institute/s. If business is a company, the
management & control vest in the hand of Board of Directors, duly elected by a democratic
process as set up by the law. Due to various reasons, all shareholders are not participating in
electing members of the board. The board members influence in setting & achieving objectives
of the company and enjoy power of using companies’ resources as they like within limits
prescribed by Article & Memorandum of Association & Companies Act. Company has to follow
mandates of relevant Accounting Standards in preparing & reporting Financial Statements.
Company Act provides provisions relating to special procedure when there is conflicting interest
of members of the Board or top management with the interest of the company. If the company is
listed in any stock exchange, it has to further follow provisions of clause 49 of SEBI listing
agreement. SEBI also ensure shareholder protection by various checks and preventing undue
advantage of insider information and unfair takeovers. Financial Statements are the best
indicators to report how corporate governance principles are executed. These statements are
prepared on the basis of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Accounting
Standards prescribes recognition, valuation, reporting & disclosure of financial information.
Globalization has opened new horizons for business to expand its operation but at the same time
global transactions has new challenges to encounter. The parties to the business transaction many
times take undue advantages from international business. Transaction amongst associate
concerns & relatives require special scrutiny. Income Tax Act has enacted provisions to assess
true value of the transaction by incorporating principles of Transfer Pricing.
By and large express provision for corporate governance exists for listed companies only. There
are no special provisions for family controlled companies. In year 2007, Central Government
issued guidelines on corporate governance for central public enterprises. It is voluntary in nature
and there are no similar guidelines for state controlled public sector units as such. Similarly
clause 49 applies to the listed companies and there are no express provisions on corporate
governance issues for un-listed companies how so big it is. Companies Act, 1956 have implied
provision that has bearing on corporate governance that applies to all class of companies. Non-
companies, how so big in operation & important it is to the public have no similar provisions for
corporate governance norms. Accounting Standards issued by ICAI have control over its
members if they fail to comply in his audit report. But ICAI has no authority to act against
enterprise per se violating Accounting Standards norms. However, the accounting standards
prepared and issued by the ICAI were mandatory only for its members, who, while discharging
their audit function, were required to examine whether the said standards of accounting were
complied with. With the amendment of the Companies Act, 1956 through the subsequent
amendment in 1999 & specifying rule in 2006, Accounting Standards are now indirectly integral
parts of the Companies Act, which will provide statutory backing. It says that every company
and its auditor shall comply with the Accounting Standards in the manner specified in the rules.
The Accounting Standards shall be applied in the preparation of General Purpose Financial
Statements. Sec. 211 says that
The Government of India recognizing the importance of financial reporting in providing essential
financial information about the company to its shareholders and other stakeholders, as an integral
and important part of good corporate governance. Such information needs to be reliable, free
from bias and should enable comparison on the basis of common benchmarks. This, in turn,
necessitates an appropriate, financial reporting system in the form of accounting standards that
incorporate sound accounting principles and reflect a true picture of the financial health of the
company while ensuring legally enforceable accountability.
The following table provides brief information on the provisions that are directly or indirectly
relevant for good corporate governance, along with the consequences of violation of the
particular provision.
The
Legislation
Table – 1
Legal Framework for Corporate Governance in India
Provision Penalty Rema
rk
The
Constitutional
Law of India
Article 38 & 39, The government is
directed that the ownership & control of
the material resources are so distributed
as to conform to the common good &
operation of the economic system does
not result into concentration of wealth
& means of production to the common
detriment
It is source of legislation
to enact rules to conform
directions given by
constitution and by such
rules, if fundamental
right of a person is
violated, courts give
priority for common
interest
There
is no
direct
bearin
g on
corpor
ate
govern
ance
issues
or on
any
person
Companies Sec. 59, If any prospectus is issued in   Punishable with
Act, 1956 contravention of section 57 or 58, the company,
and every person, who is knowingly a
party to the issue thereof, shall be
punishable with fine which may extend
to fifty thousand rupees
Sec. 63, Criminal liability for
misstatements in prospectus, Where a
prospectus issued includes any untrue
statement, every person who authorized
the issue of the prospectus
68. Penalty for fraudulently inducing
persons to invest money
105. Penalty for concealing name of
creditor, etc.
Sec. 162 provides penalty for
contravention of not filing annual return
& statement as prescribed
Sec. 211 (3A) Every profit and loss
account and balance sheet of the
company shall comply with the
accounting standards.
(3B) Where the profit and loss account
and the balance sheet of the company do
not comply with the accounting
standards, such companies shall disclose
in its profit and loss account and balance
sheet, (a) the deviation from the
accounting standards;
(b) the reasons for such deviation; and
(c) the financial effect, if any, arising
due to such deviation.
Section 217 sub section (2AA) inserted
by the Companies Amendment Act,
2000 states that The Board's report shall
also include a Directors' Responsibility
Statement indicating therein (1) that in
preparation of annual accounts, the
applicable accounting standards had
been followed along with proper
explanation relating to material
departure
imprisonment for a term
which may extend to five
years, or with fine which
may extend to one
hundred thousand rupees
or with both
Punishable with
imprisonment for a term
which may extend to
one/two year, or with
fine, or with both
Punishable with fine
which may extend to five
hundred rupees for every
day during which the
default continues
The statutory auditors are
required to make
qualification in their
report in case any item is
treated differently from
the prescribed
Accounting Standard. In
addition to this Section
227(3)(d) of Companies
Act, 1956 requires an
auditor to report whether,
in his opinion, the profit
and loss account and
balance sheet are
complied with the
accounting standards
referred to in Section
211(3C) of Companies
Act, 1956.
Sec. 225 deals with Statutory Audit of a The company, and every
company,  company  require  to  take officer of the company
certificate   of   auditor   that   certify who is in default, shall be
financial statement as true & fair punishable with fine
Auditor  ensures  financial  statement  is which may extend to five
the   result   of   financial   transaction thousand rupees
recorded and reported as per GAAP
Sec.  232  provides  penalty  for  not
complying with preparing, presenting,
submitting/filing audit report as
prescribed u/s 225-231
Sec. 279 prescribe penalty for holding For each additional
directorship   in   more   number   of company in which he is
companies than prescribed director, Rs. 50000
Sec. 297 prescribe taking sanction of the Interested director can
Board  of  company  if  a  director  has not participate in the
interest  in  certain  contract  with  the voting in Board meeting
company for the purpose
Sec  299  provide  responsibility  of  a
director  to  disclose  his  interest  in  the
contract with the company
Sec.  300  states  that  the  interested
director  can  not  participate  or  vote  in
Board's proceedings
Sec.   371   prescribes   penalty   for Shall be punishable with
contravention of section 369 (Loans to fine which may extend to
managing  agent),  370  (Loans,  etc.,  to fifty thousand rupees or
companies under the same management) with simple
or  370A,  pertaining  to  intra-company imprisonment for a term
loan or borrowing or creating liabilities which may extend to six
like guarantee etc. months
Sec. 372 prescribes restriction on
purchase of share etc. of any company
by putting limits
Sec.  628,  629  prescribes  penalty  for Punishable with
false statements or false evidences imprisonment for a term,
which may extend to
two/seven years, and
shall also be liable to
fine.
Security Contracts of security trade in designated Punishable with
Contract Act, area, time, licensing, to deal with imprisonment for a term
1956 recognized dealer, through    stock which may extend to one
exchange  etc.  Contract  otherwise  than year, or with fine, or with
this may be void both, authority is
empowered to de-list a
company
SEBI: Listing Composition  of  Board  (at  least  half Company  may  be  de-
Agreement, should be non-executive, independent), listed from stock
Clause 49 Non executive directors’ compensation exchange
and disclosures, board meetings
(minimum  4  in  a  year),  ceiling  on
director’s  membership in committees
(maximum  10),  ceiling  chairman  of
committees (maximum 5), Audit
Committee chairman should be
independent  director,  2/3rd members
should   independent   &   finance   or
accounting expert, applicability of code
of conduct over Board members & top
management, appointment of
independent  director  as  director  of  a
subsidiary company, procedure to assess
risks  &  disclosures  thereof,  CEO  &
CFO certification of financial statement,
report on corporate governance
compliance
SEBI: Four  prone  control/  penal  provisions: Penalty  of  Rs. 100,000
Takeover & Directions in investor interest, per day of continuing
Insider Adjudication Proceedings, Criminal violation, penalty is 3 to
Trading, Prosecution, Enquiry Proceedings 5 time of undue gain or
Shareholder Any person who, directly or indirectly, advantage, Violation may
Protection etc. acquires or agrees to acquire shares or leads to freeze of transfer
voting rights in the target company, or of share, voting  rights,
acquires  or  agrees  to  acquire  control debarring from access to
over  the  target  company,  either  by capital  markets, forefeet
himself  or  with  any  person  acting  in escrow money,
concert with the acquirer shall inform on imprisonment up  to  10
crossing 5% or 10% or 14%, 54% and years and penalty of Rs.
74% inform Target Company and Stock 2.5 million in criminal
Exchange   within   2   days,   Persons offenses
holding   between   15%   &   55%,   to
disclose purchase or sales aggregating to
2%  or  more,  within  2  days  to  target
company and the stock exchanges, open
offer to purchase at least 20% of share at
same price if holding cross 15%. Ban on
using  inside  information  for  personal
gain  by  way  of  purchase  or  sale
securities for those who have access of
internal information
Accounting  AS-1 Disclosure of Accounting Clause (6) Part I, Second
Standards (AS)
issued by ICAI
(Institute of
Chartered
Accountants of
India)
Indian Penal
Code
Income Tax
Act 1961
Policies Schedule of the
 AS-14 Accounting for Chartered Accountants
Amalgamations Act, 1949, provides that,
 AS-17 Segment Reporting failure  of  an  auditor  to
 AS -18 Related Party report  a  known material
Disclosures mis-statement in    the
 AS-21  Consolidated  Financial financial statements of a 
Statements company, with which he
isconcerned ina AS-23 Accounting for
Investments in Associates in professional capacity,shall  be  deemed  to  beConsolidated Financial
'professional misconduct’Statements
 AS-27  Financial  Reporting  of ICAI  may  tale   action 
Interests in Joint Ventures against auditor only
Sec. 227 (3d) whether, in opinion of
the  auditor,  the  profit  and  loss
account  and  balance-sheet  comply
with the accounting standards
referred  to  in  sub-section  (3C)  of
section  211;  he  may  qualify  his
report  and  note  observations  or
comments  of  the  auditors  which
have  any  adverse  effect  on  the
functioning of the company
Sec.  120B  (Criminal  conspiracy)  406, Imprisonment up  to 10
409,  420,  468,  471,  477A  relating  to years
fraud,  cheating  public,  creating  false
documents, duping money etc.
Regulations (2002)    contained   the Authorizes the assessing
mechanism   to   ensure   that   income of  officer  to  refer  the
arising out of international transactions process of determination
between related   parties (associated of arm’s length price to
enterprises) is computed on the basis of the transfer pricing
arm’s length. officer amounts to
reassessment
Execution of Legal Framework:
There are series of legislation measures, but there is no vigilant monitoring agency to bring on
surface irregularities observed at any layer. There are various layers of executives, various
agencies, but there is no coordination among them. In spite of several provisions, hardly few
come to the notice of executives and even handful out of them are prosecuted. A note by
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) said, out of the 2,693 actively-traded companies where Clause
49 is applicable, approximately 18% have either not reported or have reported non-compliance
for the quarter ended June 2006. Currently, 4,751 companies are listed on BSE. SEBI receives
quarterly reports from Stock Exchanges regarding compliance with Clause 49 of the listing
agreement. Clause 49 deals with corporate governance by companies listed on the exchanges.
Based on these reports, SEBI has initiated adjudication proceedings only against a total of 20
companies. Among adjudicated companies, five companies are public sector companies against
whom proceedings have been launched for non-compliance with provisions relating to Board
composition. Out of these 15 private sector companies, proceedings have been initiated against
three companies for non-compliance with almost all the major provisions of Clause 49, against
two companies for non-compliance with provisions like Board/Audit committee composition and
CEO/CFO certification, while for the balance 10 companies, proceedings have been initiated for
non-submission of compliance reports on Clause 49 to the Stock Exchanges. The Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has initiated ‘adjudication proceedings’ against 20 companies
for not complying with the Clause 49 provision of the listing agreement pertaining to corporate
governance. Such action would involve imposing monetary penalties on the companies in
question. This is the first time the market regulator has formally acted against companies for not
adhering to the provision, which defines certain corporate governance rules for listed companies
including board composition. Out of the 15 private sector companies, action has been initiated
against three companies for non-compliance with almost all the major provisions of Clause 49.
Two companies have not complied with provisions like board/audit committee composition and
CEO/CFO certification, while the rest have not submitted compliance reports on Clause 49 to
stock exchanges. The action against the state-owned companies has been initiated for non-
compliance with provisions relating to board composition.
The Department of Company Affairs prosecuted only 400 companies in 2006. Many of the
companies are indulged into serious fraud and vanished with public money. As per department’s
note, the government suspects many of the companies against prosecution is launched might
have vanished after raising money from the public. ‘‘We have issued notices to them. But some
of these letters have come back saying ‘addressee not found’,’’ said a government source.
According to market estimates, assuming that each company mobilized an average of Rs 10
crore,  these  companies  might  have  raised  at  least  Rs  4,000  crore  from  the  capital  market.
Besides, at least Rs 1,000 crore of investors’ money could be locked up in these companies in the
form of fixed deposits and other instruments. There is no reliable research on total stake of
family based companies among all companies working in India. But it is believed that more than
one third are family controlled business houses. Our study also substantiates these figures as
outlined elsewhere in this report.
There are enough provisions in the Companies Act, 1956 & Indian Penal Code to penalize errant
directors and officers, major problem lies in the fact that most of the provisions are in the statute
book, rarely used and mostly misused or abused. Executing these provisions till adjudication
ends is time consuming and hence its deterrent effect diminishes. Court procedures are highly
cumbersome & slow. Few prosecution take place out of those reported for irregularities. There is
no record how many violations go unrecorded. The solution therefore is to ensure proper
corporate governance execution, monitoring, control and report deviation within stipulated time.
There is strong need to make regulating institutions and laws functional. Another problem that
make legal system ineffective, the courts are taking long time to dispose the case. Over a period
of time and passing of the long time, the documents, witnesses, records are not available so
evidences become weak, and offenders escape un-penalized.
There is no effective machinery to monitor implementation of corporate governance rules,
whether they are observed or not on one hand while on other hand in large number of offenses,
penalty is very small compared to gravity of offense and benefit grabbed by offender.
Satyam Computer Fraud – Greatest Corporate Governance Failure:
As discussed above, we surveyed 300 respondents to know their perception on corporate
governance practices. The respondents chosen were comprised of investors, auditors, finance &
legal experts and M.B.A. students. The 68% respondents responded that family based companies
are violating corporate governance norms as prescribed by clause 49 of SEBI. We found from
that respondents and substantiated from available literature that at least following firms are under
public scanner and doubtful in observing good corporate governance norms. They include: Birla
group (Priyamvada Birla & Lodha), Reliance group, India Bulls, Satyam Computers and
Ranbaxy Laboratories.
We probed the Satyam Computer Company fraud in light of above legal provisions and found
that in spite of series of legislation, the so called big IT company can violate and can violate at
this magnitude and that too for long period of time! We first narrate the brief facts of the case
and have attached (Annexure-III) letter written by former Chairman of Satyam Computers
confessing the crime. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. was founded in 1987. The company is
engaged in information technology (IT) services spanning various sectors, and is listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and Euronext. Satyam's network covers 67 countries across six
continents. The company employs 53,000 IT professionals across development centers in India,
the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, Hungary, Singapore,
Malaysia, China, Japan, Egypt and Australia. It serves over 654 global companies, 185 of which
are Fortune 500 corporations. Satyam has several subsidiaries and group companies. Most
controversial is Maytas Infrastructure. Satyam failed in acquiring interest in its associate
concern, which is engaged in altogether different business line. Maytas is controlled by Raju
Ramalinga (The Chairman till 7th January 2009) and majority shareholders are family members
of Raju.
The meaning of Satyam is truth. The fact is reverse than what it actually means! In a shocking
letter, Mr. Raju confessed that the actual cash (Rs. 321 crore) was only 5% of what was shown
(Rs. 5361 crore) on the Balance Sheet. It is shocking that how top global accounting firm
PriceWaterhouseCooper signed Satyam's Financial Statements for couple of years and how
regulators in India, Europe and the United States apparently failed to pick up any whiff of
problems. However Chairman denied that no other member of the Board or Family is involved or
knowing the fact. It is in fact unbelievable that such a fraud can be carried for long time without
knowledge of key personnel. Either they are part of conspiracy or gross negligence. The second
reason is hard to trust as so called independent directors are big experts. Either independent
directors have failed in their role as independent director or are per se inefficient. There was
understated liability of Rs. 1230 crores, beside non-existent accrued income of Rs. 376 crore. In
the last quarter that was ended on September 30, 2008, actual profit margin was Rs. 61 crore,
while it was shown on audited statement as Rs. 649 crore!. There were several items, which were
fake per se. In fact the fraud shown may be even more serious than confessed, only investigation
and future can tell the real picture.
After his confession on 7th January 2009, the prosecuting agencies have arrested Mr. Raju on 9th
January and the Board members are suspended. New York stock exchange suspended the
business in Satyam Securities.
Apart from the charges leveled by Indian government, investors in USA have filed lawsuit.
Before the scam on surface, World Bank banned the errant firm from business for seven years.
World Bank alleged theft of data, violation of terms of business and indulging in bribe. Satyam
also faced several lawsuits including one filed in April 2007, by Upaid, in the Texas court
against Satyam—India’s fourth largest computer services company—alleging fraud, forgery,
misrepresentation and breach of contract involving transfer of intellectual property rights issues
arising from a project the firms jointly worked and asked to compensate for $1 billion.
Satyam faced a serious management credibility crisis since chairman B. Ramalinga Raju led a
move to use $1.6 billion (Rs7,760 crore) of Satyam’s money to buy two infrastructure firms
owned by his family members under the pretext of diversification. The recent crisis surfaced
when Satyam Computer Services Ltd proposed to acquire stake in a company related to its
promoters but unrelated to its core competency. The company under question named as reverse
letter of SATYAM, known as MYTAS is engaged in infrastructure. Board that included
independent directors approved it. In Indian language, Satyam means truth! and its reverse lies!!
This has called into question the role of independent directors on the board. The widespread
anger forced to put off the acquisition. Shareholders, who rely on the presence of such directors
to provide the balance against transgressions of governance, must now be wondering whether
there are other instances, which pass unnoticed. Company’s independent directors included the
biggies. There is crisis of public confidence in business, auditors, lawmakers & executing
agencies. By any yardstick, these are men of eminence and learning who should be independent.
Yet this fiasco took place on their watch. One can well imagine the Securities and Exchange
Board of India and the US Securities Exchange Commission wondering, if a board so exalted
could not protect the interests of minority shareholders, what can one hope for governance at all.
The basic question is, to what an extent, independent director is really independent in decision-
making process? The composition of the board itself is largely influenced by the likes and
dislikes of the chief executive officer, and hence the spirit of appointing independent director as
part of good corporate governance serves no basic purpose to get directions in the overall interest
of the company.
The question that raises doubt is over auditors. How a statement certified by an auditor one can
rely if Financial Statement can be inflated to such an extent? It is a failure of corporate
governance system at each layer, whether within company or outside the company, whether
expert like auditors or executives, whether interested or independent directors.
Conclusion:
Family based businesses are part of overall business scenario & indispensable. Family based
businesses are engine of growth. Due to personal stake of promoters and involvement in the
business, if they themselves manage the business, promoters are able to generate more revenue,
more profit & more wealth. Family based business react very quickly to the market demand,
hence could capture the large share of market. In the race of the greed, they are working more
efficiently & in better way. In corporate businesses, if a particular family is in control, the
management may misuse power vested in them as member of the board. This may result into
undue benefit to the related parties and violation of corporate governance norms. Blood is thicker
than water.
The current accounting and auditing system is not capable to fully protect interest of all
stakeholders. The regulatory authority is also ill equipped either by powers, skills or will. The
monitoring agencies are not functioning to the mark. The legislations and provisions are multiple
and are vague in nature. There is no coordination between different agencies like SEBI, RBI,
Department of Company Affairs etc. Penalties are small in many offenses, e.g. if a director, there
does not show conflict of interest is penalty is of Rs. 500 only, if auditors fail to qualify a report,
then ICAI can take action against auditors. If provisions of Accounting Standards are not
followed, auditor can merely make remark, which goes un-noticed for the shareholders.
Shareholders are not literate, expert in financial matters or some time simply not interested.
Shareholders elect directors by majority who are present in Annual Meeting. Only few
shareholders are remaining present in the meeting and even very few raise questions during the
meeting. Independent directors are not independent by spirit but influenced by the top
executives. In the situation, corporate governance norms are not observed at various stages, and
those are interested or responsible to implement fails to understand long-term impact of such
violations.
Suggestions:
1. There must be continuous vigilance over all widely held company, where public is
substantially interested.
2. There must be clear & identifiable authorities, which should be made accountable in case
of failure and should take speedy & strict actions.
3. Vigilance officers must be given training on how to identify & check frauds.
4. The penalty & punishment should be deterrent and of higher amount.
5. There must be provision of recovery of grabbed amount from the property created and
transferred to any person or in any other form.
6. There must be speedy disposal of disputes, investigation, prosecution and adjudication
process.
7. There must be coordination between different authorities working for different purposes.
8. There must be special corporate governance norms for family based business houses
9. Family based businesses should be made more transparent, accountable and subject to
higher surveillance
10. Clause 49 should give wide powers to Audit Committee
11. Clause 49 should have penal provision in case of failure
12. Whistle blowers must be protected and promoted by compensating if information is
correct & useful
Abbreviations & Glossary:
Lacs = One hundred thousand (one tenth of a
million) Crore = One hundred lacs (10 million)
BSE – Bombay Stock Exchange
CFO – Chief Financial Officer
CEO – Chief Executive Officer
DCA - Department of Company
Affairs FBC – Family Based Company
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
ICAI – Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
OWC – Other Widely Held Company (other than FBC & PSU)
PSU – Public Sector Unit (where 50% or more share is held by one or more government)
RBI – Reserve Bank of India
SEBI – Security Exchange Board of India
Widely Held Company – as defined by Income Tax Act 1961
Sources:
Annual Report of concerned
Companies Stock Exchanges indices
Forbes Global 2000
SEBI Act 1992, clause 49, Takeover Code
Accounting Standards, ICAI
Income Tax Act, 1961 The
Companies Act, 1056
Security Contract Act 1956
Indian Penal Code
Letter written by former chairman of Satyam Computers to Board of Directors confessing fraud
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Annexure-I
Indian Industry Ranking (Forbes)
Figure: $ Million
Rank Company Industry Type Sales Profits Assets Mkt
Value
1 Reliance Industries Oil & Gas operations 26071 2794 30669 91539
2 ONGC Oil & Gas operations 18896 4112 33795 61811
3 State Bank of India Banking 15774 1473 188565 24097
4 NTPC Utilities 7839 1596 20335 45262
5 ICICI Bank Banking 9836 639 91070 25003
6 Indian Oil Oil & Gas operations 42684 1821 25394 13095
7 SAIL Materials 7881 1450 8049 24676
8 Tata Steel Materials 5829 967 11475 13776
9 Bharti Airtel Telecommunication 4262 940 6607 48170
10 Reliance Commu. Telecommunication 3132 654 13080 39010
11 Tata Consultancy Software 4324 975 3035 26302
12 Sterlite Industries Materials 5643 1038 5553 15567
13 BHEL Capital Goods 3989 559 5175 28364
14 Infosys Tech. Software 3215 892 3082 27173
15 L & T Capital Goods 4683 518 5718 23831
16 Wipro Software 3471 681 3262 18138
17 Bharat Petroleum Oil & Gas operation 22774 496 8675 3188
18 PNB Banking 3032 377 38419 4086
19 ITC Food Drink & Tobacco 2977 638 3567 17583
20 HDFC Banking (Housing) 1487 402 16967 17645
21 Canara Bank Banking 3030 354 38538 2820
22 Tata Motors Capital Goods 7267 502 5775 7750
23 GAIL (India) Utilities 3825 589 5027 8719
24 Hindustan Petrol. Oil & Gas operation 20479 387 7586 2005
25 Hindalco Ind. Materials 4407 622 6434 4874
26 DLF Construction 5532 2590 19655 33586
27 Grasim Industries Construction 3237 455 3699 8560
28 HDFC Bank Banking 1958 266 21093 11734
29 Bank of Baroda Banking 2547 261 33975 2668
30 Hindustan Unilever Household/ Personal care 2797 427 1609 11994
31 Maruti Suzuki Auto, Consumer durable 3407 368 2398 8049
32 Bank of India Banking 2481 256 32796 3875
33 Mahindra & Mahi. Auto, Consumer durable 4074 346 4593 4655
34 IDBI Banking 1703 136 24514 2529
35 Union Bank of India Banking 1903 196 23760 1984
36 Unitech Construction 761 302 3029 13802
37 Central Bank of India Banking 1577 118 21441 1309
38 Syndicate Bank Banking 1541 166 20659 1134
39 Indian Overseas Bank Banking 1432 233 19034 1784
40 UCO Bank Banking 1347 73 17324 829
41 Satyam Computer Software 2323 452 2306 1200
42 Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals 4532 612 6041 2538
43 Suzlon Windmills
44 India Bulls Real Estate 1686 580 14722 3405
Annexure-II
Detail of Stock Index Movement of leading Indian Companies
No. Rank Company Highest Lowest 31.12.2007 31.12.2008 Difference
SENSEX* 21206 7697 20287 9647 -10639
1 9 Bharti Airtel 1010 484 995 715 -280
2 13 BHEL 2626 984 2584 1362 -1222
3 26 DLF 1225 158 1074 282 -792
4 27 GRASIM 3830 831 3651 1218 -2433
5 28 HDFC Bank 1825 800 1728 997 -731
6 30 Hind Unilever 267 170 214 250 36
7 25 HINDALCO 221 38 215 51 -164
8 20 HDFC 3257 1202 2872 1487 -1385
9 19 ITC 239 132 210 171 -39
10 5 ICICI 1465 282 1232 448 -784
11 14 Infosys 2017 1040 1768 1118 -650
12 15 L & T 440 670 2172 774 -1398
13 33 M & M 368 170 322 253 -69
14 31 Maruti Suzuki 872 235 861 275 -586
15 4 NTPC 291 113 250 181 -69
16 2 ONGC 1356 538 1236 252 -174
17 10 Reliance Commu. 844 148 746 227 -519
18 1 Reliance Industries 3252 930 2881 1230 -1651
19 3 SBI 2540 991 2371 1288 -1083
20 12 Sterlite 1085 164 1035 261 -774
21 22 Tata Motors 816 122 742 159 -723
22 8 TISCO 952 146 935 217 -718
23 11 TCS 1078 418 1083 478 -605
24 16 Wipro 538 182 525 233 -292
25 6 Indian Oil 801 419 744 430 -314
26 7 SAIL 294 79 282 79 -203
27 40 UCO Bank 88 22 58 31 -27
28 29 Bank of Baroda 491 291 454 279 -175
29 35 Union Bank 230 166 208 167 041
30 39 Indian Overseas 200 77 180 84 -96
Bank
31 38 Syndicate Bank 127 66 116 67 -49
32 18 PNB 711 515 680 533 -147
33 37 Central Babk of 154 32 123 48 -75
India
34 21 Canara Bank 412 211 315 218 -97
35 32 Bank of India 388 302 366 302 -64
36 34 IDBI 180 53 175 55 -120
37 17 Bharat Petroleum 552 356 475 387 -88
38 23 GAIL (India) 366 204 357 215 -142
39 24 Hindustan 404 261 376 276 -100
Petroleum
40 36 Unitech 534 45 490 48 442
41 - Satyam 544 114 449 170 -279
42 - Ranbaxy 427 245 421 251 -170
43 - Suzlon Industries 405 66 386 67 -319
44 - India Bulls 1025 145 997 147 -850
*SENSEX – Security market index at Bombay Stock Exchange
Annexure-III




